



E-mail: Del Balso
Mullen-Esposito
Bellet
Giacobbe
Scorsolini

SUMMONS

Attorney(s) Ralph P. Ferrara, Esquire
Office Address 50 W. State Street
Suite 1100
Town, State, Zip Code Trenton, NJ 08608
Telephone Number (609) 571-3738
Attorney(s) for Plaintiff Rick Vanderclock
RICK VANDERCLOCK

Superior Court of New Jersey

Passaic COUNTY
LAW DIVISION

Docket No: L-2155-19

Plaintiff(s)

Vs.

THE TWP OF WAYNE, JAMES CLARKE, KEITH

O'SULLIVAN, MATTHEW GIACOBBE, NEAL BELLET et al

Defendant(s)

CIVIL ACTION SUMMONS

From The State of New Jersey To The Defendant(s) Named Above:

The plaintiff, named above, has filed a lawsuit against you in the Superior Court of New Jersey. The complaint attached to this summons states the basis for this lawsuit. If you dispute this complaint, you or your attorney must file a written answer or motion and proof of service with the deputy clerk of the Superior Court in the county listed above within 35 days from the date you received this summons, not counting the date you received it. (A directory of the addresses of each deputy clerk of the Superior Court is available in the Civil Division Management Office in the county listed above and online at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/prose/10153_deptyclerklawref.pdf.) If the complaint is one in foreclosure, then you must file your written answer or motion and proof of service with the Clerk of the Superior Court, Hughes Justice Complex, P.O. Box 971, Trenton, NJ 08625-0971. A filing fee payable to the Treasurer, State of New Jersey and a completed Case Information Statement (available from the deputy clerk of the Superior Court) must accompany your answer or motion when it is filed. You must also send a copy of your answer or motion to plaintiff's attorney whose name and address appear above, or to plaintiff, if no attorney is named above. A telephone call will not protect your rights; you must file and serve a written answer or motion (with fee of \$175.00 and completed Case Information Statement) if you want the court to hear your defense.

If you do not file and serve a written answer or motion within 35 days, the court may enter a judgment against you for the relief plaintiff demands, plus interest and costs of suit. If judgment is entered against you, the Sheriff may seize your money, wages or property to pay all or part of the judgment.

If you cannot afford an attorney, you may call the Legal Services office in the county where you live or the Legal Services of New Jersey Statewide Hotline at 1-888-LSNJ-LAW (1-888-576-5529). If you do not have an attorney and are not eligible for free legal assistance, you may obtain a referral to an attorney by calling one of the Lawyer Referral Services. A directory with contact information for local Legal Services Offices and Lawyer Referral Services is available in the Civil Division Management Office in the county listed above and online at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/prose/10153_deptyclerklawref.pdf

Michelle Smith /s/
Clerk of the Superior Court

DATED: 07/10/2019

Name of Defendant to Be Served: The Township of Wayne

Address of Defendant to Be Served: 475 Valley Road, Wayne, NJ 07470

FERRARA LAW GROUP, P.C.

By: Ralph P. Ferrara, Esquire (ID 024521985)

50 West State Street, Suite 1100

Trenton, NJ 08608

(609) 571-3738

RICK VANDERCLOCK,	:	SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	:	LAW DIVISION
	:	PASSAIC COUNTY
	:	DOCKET NO.
<i>vs.</i>	:	
	:	
THE TOWNSHIP OF WAYNE, JAMES	:	VERIFIED COMPLAINT, JURY
CLARKE, KEITH O'SULLIVAN,	:	DEMAND, CERTIFICATIONS and
MATTHEW GIACOBBE, NEAL BELLET,	:	DESIGNATION OF TRIAL COUNSEL
AND JOHN DOES 1-10,	:	
<i>Defendants.</i>	:	

COMPLAINT AT LAW

Plaintiff, Rick Vanderclough, a resident and citizen of the United States, the State of New Jersey, the County of Passaic and the Township of Wayne, by way of this Verified Complaint against the defendants, alleges and says:

1. Plaintiff is a police officer with the rank of Corporal in the Wayne Police Department. Plaintiff has been a police officer for more than twenty years and has a superior record of service including multiple lifesaving awards and a Meritorious Service Award for saving his lieutenant from drowning while serving the public safety during a hurricane and saving a civilian woman from a burning house. Plaintiff became a police officer in 1997 in Pequannock and he joined the Wayne Police Department in 2003.

2. This lawsuit arises from the long pattern of misconduct and unlawful activity of the Wayne Police Department since it came under the regime of Chief James Clarke ("Clarke") in 2014.

3. In February 2017 the members of Local 136 of the Policeman's Benevolent Association ("PBA") voted that they had no confidence in Clarke. This was an extraordinary, almost unheard-of action in the New Jersey law enforcement community.

4. Though the no confidence vote was a secret ballot, the defendants and other officers were aware that Plaintiff voted with the majority of the PBA Local 136 that he had no confidence in Clarke, and that he also openly supported fellow police officer Erik Ferschman who was wrongfully terminated by these defendants.

THE PARTIES

5. Plaintiff, Rick Vanderclock, resides in Wayne, New Jersey at an undisclosed address to protect his safety as a police officer.

6. Defendant Township of Wayne is a municipality in Passaic County, New Jersey (the "Township").

7. Defendant James Clarke ("Clarke") is, upon information and belief, a citizen and resident of the United States, New Jersey, and Passaic County.

8. At all times material Defendant Clarke is and has been the Wayne Police Department Chief and an employee and officer of the Township.

9. Defendant Keith O'Sullivan ("O'Sullivan") is, upon information and belief, a citizen and resident of the United States, New Jersey and Passaic County.

10. At all times material O'Sullivan is and has been a Captain in the Wayne Police Department and an employee and officer of the Township.

11. Defendant Matthew Giacobbe, Esq. ("Giacobbe") is, upon information and belief, a citizen and resident of the United States, New Jersey and Passaic County.

12. At all times material Giacobbe is and has been an employee and officer of the Township and a member of its legal department. Upon information and belief, Mr. Giacobbe is admitted to practice law in the State of New Jersey.

13. Defendant Neal Bellet ("Bellet") is, upon information and belief, a citizen and resident of the United States, New Jersey and Passaic County.

14. At all times material Bellet is and has been an employee and officer of the Township and its Business Administrator.

15. Defendants, John Doe 1 through 10, inclusive, are individuals whose identities are presently unknown but who are believed and therefore alleged to be citizens and residents of the United States, New Jersey and Passaic County.

16. At all times material Defendants John Doe 1 through 10, inclusive, are employees, officers, and/or agents of the Township of Wayne, New Jersey.

17. At all times material Defendants John Doe 1 through 10, inclusive, acted individually and/or in concert with the defendants named herein and they did commit the actions, omissions and torts listed in this Complaint to the detriment of Plaintiff.

18. At all times material Defendants John Doe 1 through 10, inclusive, had knowledge of the actions, omissions and torts listed in this Complaint and conspired with the defendants named herein to commit the same to the detriment of Plaintiff.

19. At all times material Defendants John Doe 1 through 10, inclusive, had knowledge of the actions, omissions and torts listed in this Complaint, had a legal duty to stop, restrain, and/or correct the same but failed to do so to the detriment of Plaintiff.

20. At all times material all defendants were officers and/or employees of the government.

21. At all times material all defendants were joint venturers, agents of each other, confederates of each other, and/or co-conspirators acting for a single purpose.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

22. This Court has *in personam* jurisdiction over all Defendants.

23. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear this controversy.

24. Pursuant to R. 4:3-2(a), venue is proper in Passaic County because the cause of action arose here, and one or more parties reside here at the time of commencement of this action.

BACKGROUND OF THIS LAWSUIT

25. In 2014 Clarke became chief of the Wayne Police Department and at all times material thereafter he engaged in unlawful discrimination, hostility, harassment and retaliation against officers with outstanding records of service, including but not limited to Plaintiff.

26. At all times material Clarke used the instruments of his authority to commit torts against, and violate the rights of, department officers with outstanding records of service including but not limited to Plaintiff.

27. At all times material Clarke used the instruments of his authority to engage in a pattern of unlawful conduct including theft by misappropriation of property against department officers with outstanding records of service including but not limited to Plaintiff.

**DEFENDANTS' PREDICATE ACTS INVOLVING A
PATTERN OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY**

28. "Racketeering activity" includes, among other things, theft and all crimes defined in chapter 20 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes. N.J.S.A. § 2C:41-1(a)(1)(n).

29. "Racketeering activity" includes, for an officer or employee of the government, failing to pay or account for money or property of another upon lawful demand. N.J.S.A. § 2C:20-9.

30. A pattern of racketeering activity requires two incidents of racketeering conduct ("predicate acts") within ten years that embrace criminal conduct with similar purposes, results, participants, victims, methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents. N.J.S.A. § 2C:41-1(d).

31. "Racketeering activity" includes a conspiracy to commit a predicate act. *State v. Bisaccia*, 724 A.2d 836, 846 (App. Div. 1999).

A. FIRST PREDICATE ACT OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY

32. On or about December 18, 2015 all defendants, and each of them, wrongfully terminated the employment of a police officer, Erik Ferschman, and they failed to pay money that was lawfully owed to him.

33. As previously stated, Plaintiff openly supported Officer Ferschman and attended an open meeting in his matter. Plaintiff's father-in-law was depicted in a newspaper photograph related to the meeting.

34. On or about October 19, 2017 this Honorable Court, by and through the Honorable Ernest M. Caposela, A.J.S.C., concluded in a detailed opinion that all defendants, and each of them, acted wrongfully by terminating Officer Ferschman's employment and depriving him of money that was lawfully owed to him.

B. SECOND PREDICATE ACT OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY

35. On or about June 1, 2018, all defendants, and each of them, wrongfully suspended Plaintiff from duty and failed to pay him money that was lawfully owed to him.

C. THIRD PREDICATE ACT OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY

36. After June 15, 2018 Plaintiff attempted to collect unemployment compensation for his suspension from duty, to which he was entitled under New Jersey unemployment compensation laws.

37. After June 15, 2018, all defendants, and each of them, intervened with the State of New Jersey's unemployment compensation commission and wrongfully obstructed Plaintiff's unemployment claim, thereby further depriving him of, and failing to pay, money that was lawfully owed to him.

38. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.

**DEFENDANTS' PATTERN OF CREATING A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT,
ENGAGEMENT IN DISCRIMINATION AND OTHER UNLAWFUL ACTS**

39. Beginning shortly after Clarke became Chief of the Wayne Police Department, defendants engaged in a systematic pattern of abuse and hostility in the workplace, discrimination, and other unlawful acts against Plaintiff as discussed below.

40. At all times material Plaintiff was temporarily disabled due to physical injury, surgery rehabilitation, and/or Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD").

**A. DEFENDANTS' UNLAWFUL AND IMPROPER LIGHT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS TO
PLAINTIFF WHILE HE WAS TEMPORARILY DISABLED**

41. Before Clarke's regime at the Wayne Police Department, patrol officers on light duty were not allowed to be out on patrol but were expected to work in furtherance of the department's mission of law enforcement and administration.

42. Before Clarke's regime at the Wayne Police Department, patrol officers on light duty were expected to work normal weekday business hours in headquarters to assist the

headquarters and administrative staff, to work as a team, and to foster mission accomplishment to the maximum extent practical given the officer's light duty status.

43. Before Clarke's regime at the Wayne Police Department, Plaintiff was assigned to light duty and he worked to facilitate the department's mission during normal weekday business hours assisting the headquarters and administrative staff.

44. In about the spring of 2014, Plaintiff underwent surgery to help correct symptoms of an off-duty sports injury to his shoulder and elbow.

45. During the time period after the surgery at times material, Plaintiff was temporarily physically disabled and unable to engage in the normal activities of a police officer on patrol duties.

46. As a result of his temporary physical disability, Plaintiff was placed on light duty by doctors' orders for about six to eight weeks during the spring and summer of 2014.

47. In about February 2017, Plaintiff underwent another surgery to help correct symptoms of the same off-duty sports injury to his shoulder and elbow.

48. During the time period after the surgery, Plaintiff was temporarily physically disabled and unable to engage in the normal activities of a police officer on patrol duties.

49. As a result of his temporary disability, Plaintiff was again placed on light duty by doctors' orders for about six to eight weeks during the spring of 2017.

50. Plaintiff's light duty assignments and orders from defendants restricted his liberty and were discriminatory because Plaintiff was confined to a small room by himself, prohibited from contacting co-workers or assisting with administrative duties under penalty of official reprimand.

51. Plaintiff's light duty assignments from defendants were discriminatory and did not serve any useful purpose in furtherance of the police department's mission, despite Plaintiff's ability and desire to serve the department and the people of Wayne.

52. Rather, these assignments were designed purely to humiliate and embarrass Plaintiff repeatedly and continuously in front of his colleagues and fellow police officers and to send a message at Plaintiff's expense to other officers.

53. Plaintiff's light duty assignments from defendants were punitive, harassing, discriminatory and unlawful because Plaintiff was confined to a small room by himself, prohibited from contacting co-workers or assisting with administrative duties under penalty of official reprimand.

54. Plaintiff's light duty assignments from defendants were punitive, harassing and unlawful because Plaintiff was required to sit in isolation in a room with no air conditioning in the summer under penalty of suspension and loss of pay.

55. Plaintiff was assigned to light duty over weekends, when the normal administrative and headquarters staff was not scheduled to work.

56. While Plaintiff was on light duty Clarke repeatedly told him that he was "no good" unless he was on full duty and would repeatedly smile at Plaintiff in a mocking manner.

57. While Plaintiff was on light duty defendants repeatedly pressured him to return to full duty more quickly than doctors ordered.

58. Plaintiff was treated differently from other department officers who were given light duty during normal business hours to assist headquarters staff, who were not confined to a room in headquarters with no work to perform, and who were not pressured to return to full duty in violation of doctors' orders.

59. Plaintiff's light duty assignments from all defendants, and each of them, served no legitimate purpose, hindered the administration of justice and the enforcement of the law in Wayne, were discriminatory, and wasted the taxpayer's money because Plaintiff was not permitted to work productively in a light duty assignment but instead was forced to do nothing.

60. Plaintiff's light duty assignments from all defendants, and each of them, bore no reasonable relation to Plaintiff's employment or to any legitimate medical diagnosis or treatment.

61. While Plaintiff was on light duty Clarke and O'Sullivan showed up at Plaintiff's doctors' office, in police uniform and purportedly on official police business, and attempted to unlawfully procure Plaintiff's medical and surgical records by threatening and coercing Plaintiff's doctors' administrative staff in violation of federal and New Jersey law.

B. DEFENDANTS' UNLAWFUL TREATMENT AND CONFINEMENT OF PLAINTIFF WHILE HE WAS TEMPORARILY DISABLED FOR PTSD

62. In October 2015 Plaintiff responded to a report of a car fire in Wayne.

63. When Plaintiff arrived on the scene, he was the first Wayne officer there.

64. Plaintiff took control of the scene and he observed that one car had been T-boned at an intersection, one of the drivers was partially ejected from, but pinned under the dashboard and trapped halfway inside, his car. Gasoline was spilled on the ground and on the car, and black smoke was coming from under the mangled hood.

65. Shortly thereafter, flames began to engulf the car.

66. Plaintiff and other officers heroically attempted to save the driver, they emptied all available fire extinguishers, ran for help to a local residence to obtain more firefighting supplies, and attempted to free the trapped driver.

67. Flames soon enveloped the driver, Plaintiff observed the man's clothes burned off, hair and eyebrows burned off, his skin began to cook, it turned color from charred black to ashen

white. All the while the man was screaming and pleading for his life. Plaintiff could smell and taste the victim's clothes, hair and flesh burning, along with smell and taste of the smoke, fuel and flames from the burning rubber, plastic, metal and paint.

68. The victim was eventually freed from the car and air-lifted to a burn unit, but he died of his injuries shortly after the incident.

69. Plaintiff was deeply disturbed and shaken by what he saw.

70. A few days after the fire, Plaintiff went to counseling offered by the Wayne fire department during his off-duty time because the Wayne police department, under the direction of Clarke, did not offer counseling services to its officers.

71. At times material Clarke stated to Plaintiff and other officers that Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is not a "real" affliction.

72. After the fire, Plaintiff continued to be affected by what he saw, heard, smelled and tasted when responding to the fire.

73. After the fire Plaintiff could not sleep, focus or function normally and sought treatment from the department's workers' compensation psychiatrist, Dr. Carnevale

74. Despite Clarke's statements that PTSD is not a "real" affliction, the department's workers' comp doctor, Doctor Carnevale, diagnosed Plaintiff with PTSD as a result of his on-scene involvement at the fire.

75. The department's workers' compensation doctor provided medical advice that Plaintiff needed to get out of his house, out of Wayne, and go relax, unwind, go to the mountains, and "look at the cows in Vermont."

76. The department's workers' compensation doctor also directed Plaintiff to avoid isolation and to engage in social activities outside of his home as part of his PTSD treatment.

77. By virtue of his diagnosis with PTSD, Plaintiff was temporarily disabled and unable to engage in the normal activities of a police officer on patrol duty.

78. While he was out of work on workers' compensation leave, Plaintiff was forced to disobey medical advice because of Clarke's orders.

79. Under Clarke's orders, Plaintiff was required to remain in his home during his normal working hours, including weekends, and Clarke sent Wayne police officers to Plaintiff's residence to verify his confinement.

80. Plaintiff's confinement to his home was, under orders from Clarke, pursuant to penalty of suspension from, and termination of, Plaintiff's employment if he disobeyed and left confinement.

81. Meanwhile, the department's workers' compensation doctor, Doctor Carnevale, heard about and disagreed with Clarke's confinement orders. Doctor Carnevale was concerned that isolation and confinement would worsen Plaintiff's symptoms.

82. Doctor Carnevale told defendants, verbally and in writing, that Plaintiff's confinement was against medical advice and detrimental to the symptoms of PTSD.

83. At times material Plaintiff was treated by another psychiatrist, Doctor Stefanelli, who was provided through the Police Benevolent Association (PBA) Local 136.

84. Doctor Stefanelli agreed that Clarke's confinement orders were against medical advice and contrary to proper treatment for PTSD.

85. For treatment and recovery, patients diagnosed with PTSD need freedom and human interaction, not confinement and isolation.

86. Still, Clarke's orders were iron-clad: Plaintiff was confined to his home during working hours except to see his doctors, subject to constant verification by Wayne police officers, under penalty of suspension and termination.

87. Clarke attempted to justify his unlawful confinement orders under the auspices of the department's sick day policy.

88. But Plaintiff was not home sick, he was temporarily disabled due to PTSD incurred in the line of duty and he was out of work pursuant to New Jersey's workers' compensation laws.

89. Other officers under Clarke who were out sick were not subject to constant verification in their homes.

90. Clarke subjectively, arbitrarily, and capriciously applied the department's policies harshly to Plaintiff because of his disability and leniently or not at all to others.

91. Plaintiff was not even allowed to pick his children up from school pursuant to Clarke's order of confinement.

92. The only exception to the Clarke's confinement order was a trip to the doctor, with a call to police dispatch upon leaving home and immediately upon returning.

93. Plaintiff was not allowed to stop and put gas in his car on his way home from the doctor's office; if he was observed by Township employees, he would suffer suspension and termination.

94. Plaintiff's confinement bore no reasonable relation to his employment or to any legitimate medical diagnosis or treatment and, in fact, was contrary to doctors' orders.

95. After years of faithful service as police officer, Plaintiff complied with Clarke's unlawful confinement orders even though this was detrimental to his recovery because he feared for his job as a police officer, the only job he had ever had and the job he loved.

C. PLAINTIFF'S LACK OF REQUIRED NOTICE OF PROMOTIONAL EXAM AS A RESULT OF PLAINTIFF'S TEMPORARY DISABILITY

96. For the Wayne police department and other law enforcement departments in New Jersey, the police promotion written exam is given one time every three years, or on a triennial basis.

97. At times material, per Township Ordinance, notice of the police officer promotion exam date is to be posted "a minimum of eight weeks prior to the examination." (Wayne Ordinance No. 5-2016.)

98. Officers who are on leave at the time of the exam notice posting "shall be notified of the date [of the exam] by personal service or certified mail." (Wayne Ordinance No. 5-2016).

99. At times material in 2016, Plaintiff was on medical leave for PTSD from the fire incident per doctor's orders and New Jersey workers' compensation laws.

100. At times material while Plaintiff was on workers' comp leave all defendants, and each of them, failed to give Plaintiff the required notice of the triennial promotion exam.

101. At times material as a direct result of the defendants' discrimination and violation of the ordinance, Plaintiff missed the opportunity to take the exam and compete for promotion in 2016.

102. Plaintiff's next opportunity for promotion would be in 2019 due to the triennial timing of the promotion exam.

D. DEFENDANTS' UNLAWFUL SUSPENSION OF PLAINTIFF AS A RESULT OF HIS TEMPORARY DISABILITY

103. During and after Plaintiff's workers' comp medical leave of absence Clarke told Plaintiff and others that Plaintiff was a malingerer and that Plaintiff's medical leave for PTSD was unnecessary because, according to Clarke, PTSD is not a "real" affliction.

104. On or about Monday January 1, 2018, O'Sullivan was installed as the Wayne Police Department Internal Affairs Captain by defendants.

105. One week later, on or about Monday January 7, 2018, Plaintiff was confronted by O'Sullivan and other Township employees about a laundry-list of one hundred and twenty six (126) alleged departmental violations and infractions supposedly committed by Plaintiff that would result in disciplinary action.

106. The one hundred and twenty-six alleged infractions, which comprised an internal affairs file approximately two inches thick, covered violations that supposedly occurred during just three duty shifts: January 5, 6, and 7, 2018.

107. On about January 29, 2018 Plaintiff received a notice from defendants about the 126 false disciplinary allegations against him; though no disciplinary charges were filed at that time. (Ex. A Jan. 29, 2018 Notice).

108. In February 2018 Plaintiff was subjected to a video-taped interrogation conducted by O'Sullivan about the 126 false allegations.

109. The video-taped interrogation of Plaintiff violated his rights under the PBA collective bargaining agreement, Article XXII, because Plaintiff's PBA representative was intimidated by O'Sullivan and did not enter the interview room.

110. In February 2018 during the video-taped interrogation by O'Sullivan Plaintiff was ordered to refrain from discussing the contents of the interview with anyone, including his supervisors and his PBA representative in violation of his rights under the PBA collective bargaining agreement Article XXII.

111. Plaintiff never waived his right to have his PBA representative present.

112. In February 2018, at the conclusion of Plaintiff's video-taped interrogation by O'Sullivan, all defendants, and each of them, obtained what they believed to be sufficient information to file any alleged disciplinary charges against Plaintiff, false and meritless charges though they were.

113. New Jersey law requires that a police department file disciplinary charges "within 45 days of the date the person filing the charge obtained sufficient information to file the charge." N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 (the "45-Day Rule").

114. No disciplinary charges were filed against Plaintiff in January 2018.

115. No disciplinary charges were filed against Plaintiff in February 2018.

116. No disciplinary charges were filed against Plaintiff in March 2018.

117. No disciplinary charges were filed against Plaintiff in April 2018.

118. Disciplinary charges were filed against Plaintiff in May 2018 through notice to Plaintiff's attorney.

119. Plaintiff was never personally served with a Notice of Disciplinary Action.

120. A Notice of Disciplinary Action was never sent to Plaintiff through Certified or Registered Mail.

121. The filing of charges against Plaintiff in mid-May 2018 violated the 45-day Rule.

122. Plaintiff never waived his rights that are provided by the 45-Day Rule.

123. All defendants, and each of them, violated New Jersey law and Plaintiff's rights under the 45-Day Rule.

124. In January 2018, Plaintiff had served more than twenty years as a police officer and he had never previously been subjected to a disciplinary proceeding or had a disciplinary charge filed against him.

125. In January 2018, Plaintiff had served more than twenty years as a police officer and Plaintiff's years of evaluations performed by his supervisors never noted any disciplinary problems or alleged infractions.

126. The 126 false and meritless charges against Plaintiff were supposedly initiated by an anonymous phone call to the Department that alleged that Plaintiff was purchasing and playing scratch-off lottery tickets while on duty.

127. Though all phone calls to the Wayne police department are recorded, no copy of the alleged phone call has ever been produced to Plaintiff.

128. An anonymous phone call to the Township alleging that Plaintiff was purchasing and playing scratch-off lottery tickets while on duty never occurred.

129. The 126 false and meritless charges against Plaintiff included many charges that were unrelated to gambling.

130. Many of the false and meritless charges were related to Plaintiff leaving his assigned patrol zone.

131. The police department divides the Township of Wayne into nine different patrol zones where Zone Three is the Southbound lanes of Route 23 (the West Side of Route 23) and Zone Four is the Northbound lanes of Route 23 (the East Side of Route 23).

132. It is impossible for a Wayne police officer to stay within the bounds of Zone Three or Zone Four during a patrol. For example:

- a. It is physically impossible for an officer to patrol Zone Three, the Southbound lanes of Route 23, without leaving the zone to travel North and then resume patrol Southbound;

- b. It is physically impossible for an officer to patrol Zone Four, the Northbound lanes of Route 23, without leaving the zone to travel South and then resume patrol Northbound.
- c. To properly patrol Zone Three and/or Zone Four, crossing out of the zone is necessary.
- d. Plaintiff, who was assigned to only one zone during a duty shift, was falsely charged with leaving Zone Three and/or Zone Four when it was physically impossible for Plaintiff and all other officers to patrol Zone Three and/or Zone Four without leaving the zone.

133. The gambling charges against Plaintiff were also false and mere pretext to justify inflicting disproportionate punishment upon Plaintiff.

134. Wayne Police Department Rules and Regulations prohibit "unlawful gambling" while on duty. (Wayne Police Rules & Regs. ¶ 3:7.14(4)).

135. Scratch off lottery tickets are legal in, and sanctioned by, the State of New Jersey.

136. Legally purchasing scratch off lottery tickets while on duty is not prohibited by the Wayne Police Department Rules and Regulations. (Wayne Police Rules & Regs. ¶ 3:7.14(4)).

137. Long before January 2018, Plaintiff often purchased scratch-off lottery tickets with other members of the Wayne police department while on duty and Plaintiff had no notice from the department that purchasing lottery tickets while on duty was prohibited.

138. The charges against Plaintiff also included dozens of minor infractions that were piled on and never previously brought to Plaintiff's attention since he joined the Wayne police department in 2003. These included:

- a. checking on his parents' house which was in Wayne and in his assigned patrol zone;
- b. minor log errors;
- c. crossing into contiguous patrol zones;
- d. and other minor instances for which Plaintiff was never previously warned and for which there is no previous documentation of violation.

139. The New Jersey Attorney General has published "Guidelines on Progressive Discipline in Police Matters."

140. A system of progressive discipline is required to be instituted in an agency's rules.

141. The purpose of a progressive discipline system is to make the subject officer aware that repeated violations of the agency's rules will result in progressive discipline and inappropriate behavior is addressed before minor problems escalate into major problems. (A.G. Guidelines at p. 8).

142. New Jersey Law requires that an officer may not be suspended "for political reasons or for any cause other than incapacity, misconduct, or disobedience of rules and regulations. . . ." N.J.S.A. § 40A:14-147.

143. Beginning on June 1, 2018 Plaintiff was suspended without pay for twenty (20) consecutive twelve-hour shifts.

144. This suspension was administered despite the fact that Plaintiff was deprived of substantive and procedural due process.

145. At all times material, defendants allowed other Wayne police officers who were suspended without pay to trade-in vacation days and to serve their suspension in non-consecutive shifts in order to lessen the financial burden on the officer and his or her family.

146. At times material, Clarke told others that he was taking a "hard line" against Plaintiff for the 126 false violations that supposedly took place in a three-day period.

147. At all times material, defendants would not allow Plaintiff to trade in vacation days or to serve his suspension in non-consecutive shifts, which maximized the negative financial impact to Plaintiff and his family, in a manner grossly disproportionate to other similarly situated officers.

148. At all times material, all defendants, and each of them, violated the law, violated Plaintiff's rights under the law, discriminated against Plaintiff and engaged in a pattern of harassment and hostility towards Plaintiff.

149. At all times material, all defendants, and each of them, wrongfully coerced Plaintiff into signing a "last chance" agreement that grossly violated Plaintiff's rights under New Jersey law. (Ex. B Last Chance Agreement).

150. All defendants, and each of them, told Plaintiff that his termination was imminent and certain if the "last chance" agreement was not signed. (Ex. B).

151. Plaintiff signed the agreement under duress on June 22, 2019. (Ex. B).

152. The agreement was not signed by any of the defendants or their employees, officers or agents on June 22, 2019. (Ex. B).

153. There was no acceptance or execution of the agreement by any of the defendants, or their employees, officers or agents on June 22, 2019 or on any date noted thereafter. (Ex. B).

154. After consulting with his father-in-law, Plaintiff promptly rescinded the agreement in writing before it was accepted, signed, or executed by any of the defendants or their employees, officers or agents. (Ex. C Rescindment).

E. DEFENDANTS' CONFINEMENT OF, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST, AND HARASSMENT OF PLAINTIFF BY REQUIRING HIM ATTEND AN UNNEEDED, MEDICALLY UNNECESSARY, AND USELESS IN-PATIENT GAMBLING REHABILITATION PROGRAM IN FLORIDA AT HIS OWN EXPENSE.

155. At all times material, Plaintiff suffered from physical injuries and PTSD.

156. The 126 false disciplinary charges lodged against Plaintiff supposedly began by an anonymous phone call to the department alleging that Plaintiff was gambling while on duty by and through his purchase of scratch-off lottery tickets.

157. At no time was Plaintiff diagnosed with a gambling addiction by any doctor competent to make such a diagnosis.

158. The simple fact is that Plaintiff does not have a gambling addiction, or any other addiction for that matter.

159. In mid-May 2018, defendants notified Plaintiff that he had been ordered by Clark to attend a thirty-day in-patient gambling rehabilitation program in Florida at his own expense beginning on June 1, 2018 under penalty of immediate termination of employment.

160. The defendants' forced Plaintiff to attend thirty days of in-patient gambling addiction treatment in Florida at his own expense. This action by defendants was intended to be, and was in fact, punitive, harassing, humiliating and discriminatory because it was medically unnecessary, and entirely unnecessary in all other respects.

161. The defendants' requirement for Plaintiff to attend thirty days of in-patient gambling addiction treatment in Florida at his own expense was intended to be, and was in fact, punitive, harassing, humiliating and discriminatory because Plaintiff did not and does not have gambling debt and he is financially sound and has always supported his family's financial needs.

162. The defendants' requirement for Plaintiff to attend thirty days of in-patient gambling addiction treatment in Florida at his own expense was intended to be, and was in fact,

punitive, harassing, humiliating and discriminatory because he did not and does not have a gambling problem, which defendants either knew or should have known at the time.

163. The defendants' requirement for Plaintiff to attend thirty days of in-patient gambling addiction treatment in Florida at his own expense was intended to be, and was in fact, punitive, harassing, humiliating and discriminatory because, though Plaintiff denied that he needed any treatment at all, the defendants rejected Plaintiff's request to attend an accredited rehabilitation facility in New Jersey.

164. Plaintiff had offered this alternative under protest because he did not want to be totally and completely deprived of contact with his wife and children.

165. The defendants' requirement for Plaintiff to attend thirty days of in-patient gambling addiction treatment in Florida at his own expense was intended to be, and was in fact, punitive, harassing, humiliating and discriminatory because, after Plaintiff met several times with gambling addiction specialists at the Florida facility, he was discharged from the thirty day program weeks early by the staff and medically cleared. (Ex. D Ltr. June 21, 2018).

166. While at the Florida rehabilitation facility, under the orders of defendants, Plaintiff was confined to the facility and his liberty was restricted. In addition Plaintiff was wrongfully subjected to:

- a. a strip search of his person;
- b. confiscation of his belongings, including his money and medications;
- c. constant monitoring including while he slept;
- d. neurological testing with electrical shocks applied to Plaintiff's head.

167. The restriction of Plaintiff's liberty while in Florida bore no reasonable relation to his employment or to any legitimate medical diagnosis or treatment and constituted pure harassment and discrimination.

168. The requirement that Plaintiff attend an in-patient facility in Florida instead of New Jersey bore no reasonable relation to his employment or to any legitimate medical diagnosis or treatment and was pure harassment and discrimination.

169. Furthermore, Plaintiff was never given a hearing and was completely deprived of substantive and procedural due process.

F. DEFENDANTS REFUSED TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF ACCESS TO HIS PERSONNEL FILE

170. Under the PBA collective bargaining agreement, Article XIII, Plaintiff, like any other officer, is allowed to review his personnel files upon advance notice to the department.

171. Under the PBA collective bargaining agreement, Article XIII, an officer's personnel file shall contain all written complaints against the officer and an opportunity to provide a written rebuttal to the complaints, which shall also be placed in the personnel file.

172. Under the PBA collective bargaining agreement, Article XIII, an officer's personnel file "shall be maintained in the office of the Chief of Police."

173. Despite numerous verbal and written requests defendants denied Plaintiff the opportunity to view his personnel file in violation of the PBA's collective bargaining agreement, Article XIII.

174. Despite numerous verbal and written requests defendants denied Plaintiff the opportunity to respond in writing to the written complaints against him in violation of the PBA's collective bargaining agreement, Article XIII

G. UNDUE INFLUENCE ON PROMOTIONAL EXAMINATION AND RETALIATION FOR PLAINTIFF'S TORT CLAIM NOTICE

175. On or about September 21, 2018 Plaintiff filed a Tort Claim Notice against defendants.

176. In or about April 2019 Plaintiff participated in the triennial promotion examination process.

177. On or about April 21, 2019 Plaintiff was scheduled to take the oral portion of the promotion exam, which, according to procedure, was to be administered by three chiefs of police from other departments so that an unbiased promotion assessment could be made.

178. On or about April 21, 2019 Plaintiff arrived at the place of oral examination but Clarke was there already.

179. When Plaintiff was called into the room to undergo the oral portion of the promotion exam, Clarke inappropriately and unethically entered the exam room before Plaintiff entered and excluded Plaintiff from the room.

180. Clarke then had a five-minute conversation with the three chiefs of police who were about to administer the oral portion of Plaintiff's promotional exam. Only after Clarke concluded his conversation was Plaintiff permitted to enter the room and commence the oral portion of the promotional exam.

181. Plaintiff was administered the oral portion of the promotional exam and, though Plaintiff was pleased with his performance, he received a poor score of 69.53 out of 100 possible points.

182. In about April 2019 Plaintiff's personnel file underwent a "jacket review" as part of the triennial promotion exam process.

183. Plaintiff has been excluded from viewing his personnel file and providing input to it in violation of the PBA collective bargaining agreement.

184. All defendants, individually and in concert with one another,, gave Plaintiff a score totaling only half of the possible promotion exam points for the jacket review.

185. All defendants, individually and in concert with one another,, reviewed Plaintiff's disciplinary record in his personnel file as part of the triennial promotion exam process.

186. All defendants, individually and in concert with one another,, gave Plaintiff a score totaling only half of the possible promotion exam points for disciplinary record review despite his decades of exemplary service.

187. All defendants, individually and in concert with one another,, retaliated against Plaintiff for filing a tort claim notice and prevented him from competing fairly in the triennial promotion process in violation of his rights, New Jersey law and applicable rules and regulations.

188. All defendants, individually and in concert with one another, committed crimes, engaged in unlawful activity, violated Plaintiff's rights, and discriminated against him on the basis of disability.

COUNT I
VIOLATIONS OF RACKETEER INFLUENCED CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO) ACT
N.J.S.A. §§ 2C:41-1 ET SEQ.
Plaintiff v. All Defendants

189. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all previous and subsequent paragraphs as though set forth at length herein.

190. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, aided in the planning, solicitation, and commission of the crime of racketeering in that they did conspire, confederate and agree together that:

- a. One or more of them would and did engage in conduct which would constitute the crime of racketeering;
- b. One or more of them would aid in the planning, solicitation, and commission of the crime of racketeering, that is all defendants, and each of them, being persons employed by and associated with an enterprise, which enterprise was engaged in and the activities of which affected trade and commerce, would conduct and participate, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of New Jersey law as described in the paragraphs above and below.

191. The conspiracy occurred beginning on or about January 1, 2014 and is continuing in the State of New Jersey, County of Passaic, Township of Wayne, elsewhere and within the jurisdiction of this Court.

192. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, constituted and conducted an illicit enterprise within the meaning of New Jersey law, that is a group of individuals associated in fact.

193. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, affiliated themselves through an informal organizational structure in which each member was responsible for specific conduct in furtherance of the enterprise, and assisted and participated in criminal and other activities of the enterprise.

194. At all times material it was part of the conspiracy that the purposes of the enterprise would include the following:

- a. depriving law enforcement officers, including but not limited to Plaintiff and Officer Ferschman, of monies lawfully owed to them;

b. violating N.J.S.A. § 2C:20-9.

195. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, did commit the racketeering conduct of theft by misappropriation by a government official by unlawfully and wrongfully depriving law enforcement officers, including but not limited to Plaintiff and Officer Ferschman, of monies lawfully owed to them.

196. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, acted against the peace of this State, the government, the Plaintiff, and the dignity of the same.

197. As a direct and/or proximate result of the racketeering activities of all defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered damages and has been deprived of economic and noneconomic benefits including, but not limited to, lost wages, pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of fringe benefits, loss of promotional opportunities, and other damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for compensatory and punitive damages pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 2C:41-4(a) plus interest, costs, attorney's fees as well as referral to the Attorney General pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 2C:41-4(b) and such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

COUNT II

**VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW JERSEY LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
HARASSMENT, HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND RETALIATION**

N.J.S.A. §§ 10:5-1 ET SEQ.

Plaintiff v. All Defendants

198. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all previous and subsequent paragraphs of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein.

199. At all times material Plaintiff was a member of the protected class because of his temporary disability due to physical injury, surgical recuperation and/or PTSD.

200. At all times material Plaintiff's doctors ordered light duty for, and Plaintiff requested light duty during, those periods of time when he was not able to fully perform the duties of his job as a police officer on patrol duty.

201. At all times material Plaintiff's doctors ordered workers' compensation medical leave from patrol duty due to PTSD suffered in the line of duty and Plaintiff requested such leave.

202. At all times material defendants were on notice that Plaintiff filed a tort claim notice against them.

203. At all times material during, after, and as a result of, Plaintiff's requests for light duty, medical leave, and Plaintiff's filing of a tort claim notice, he was subject to harassment, discrimination and a hostile work environment including but not limited to:

- a. unlawful confinement during periods of light duty;
- b. unlawful isolation during periods of light duty;
- c. lack of useful assignments that he could perform while on light duty;
- d. unlawful suspension;
- e. unlawful fabrication of disciplinary charges;
- f. unlawful interference with, and denial of, promotion opportunities;
- g. unlawful deprivation of access to Plaintiff's personnel files;
- h. unlawful failure to provide adequate medical treatment for injuries sustained at work;
- i. unlawful interference with doctors' treatment instructions;
- j. unlawful violation of Plaintiff's rights;
- k. unlawful violation of the PBA collective bargaining agreement;
- l. unlawful retaliation against Plaintiff.

204. At all times material defendants failed to accommodate or otherwise make provisions as required by law.

205. At all times material defendants took affirmative steps to harass, intimidate, humiliate Plaintiff and discriminate and retaliate against him as a result of, and in retaliation for, his disability and his tort claim notice.

206. At all times material defendants took affirmative steps to create a hostile work environment for Plaintiff as a result of, and in retaliation for, his disability and his tort claim notice.

207. As a direct and/or proximate result of the discrimination of all defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered damages and has been deprived of economic and noneconomic benefits including, but not limited to, lost wages, pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of fringe benefits, loss of promotional opportunities, and other damages.

208. The conduct of all defendants, and each of them, was knowing, willful, wanton and was designed to deprive Plaintiff of his rights as guaranteed under the law, thereby entitling Plaintiff to an award of punitive and/or exemplary damages.

209. At all relevant times, the individual defendants acted as agents of the Township of Wayne, and thus the Township of Wayne is vicariously liable for their actions and omissions.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for compensatory and punitive damages plus interest, costs, and attorneys' fees and such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

COUNT III
VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW CONSCIENTIOUS EMPLOYEE PROTECTION ACT
N.J.S.A. §§ 39:19-1 ET SEQ.
Plaintiff v. All Defendants

210. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all previous and subsequent paragraphs of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein.

211. Plaintiff engaged in legally protected activity by *inter alia*, openly supporting Officer Ferschman, voting no confidence against Clarke along with the majority of his union, and filing a tort claims notice against defendants.

212. In retaliation for these actions, defendants caused Plaintiff to experience adverse employment action, including, but not limited to:

- a. unlawful confinement during periods of light duty;
- b. unlawful isolation during periods of light duty;
- c. lack of useful assignments that he could perform while on light duty;
- d. unlawful suspension;
- e. unlawful fabrication of disciplinary charges;
- f. unlawful interference with, and denial of, promotion opportunities;
- g. unlawful deprivation of access to Plaintiff's personnel files;
- h. unlawful failure to provide adequate medical treatment for injuries sustained at work;
- i. unlawful interference with doctors' treatment instructions;
- j. unlawful violation of Plaintiff's rights;
- k. unlawful violation of the PBA collective bargaining agreement.

213. Defendants' actions constitute violations of the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1, *et seq.* ("CEPA").

214. As a direct and/or proximate result of the retaliation of all defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered damages and has been deprived of economic and noneconomic benefits including, but not limited to, lost wages, pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of fringe benefits, loss of promotional opportunities, and other damages.

215. The conduct of all defendants, and each of them, was knowing, willful, wanton and was designed to deprive Plaintiff of his rights as guaranteed under the law, thereby entitling Plaintiff to an award of punitive and/or exemplary damages.

216. At all relevant times, the individual defendants acted as agents of the Township of Wayne, and thus the Township of Wayne is vicariously liable for their actions and omissions.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for compensatory and punitive damages plus interest, costs, and attorneys' fees and such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

COUNT IV
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
Plaintiff v. All Defendants

217. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all previous and subsequent paragraphs of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein.

218. Plaintiff engaged in legally protected activity by *inter alia*, openly supporting Officer Ferschman, voting no confidence against Clarke along with the majority of his union, and filing a tort claims notice against defendants.

219. In retaliation for these actions, defendants caused Plaintiff to experience adverse employment action, including, but not limited to:

- a. unlawful confinement during periods of light duty;
- b. unlawful isolation during periods of light duty;
- c. lack of useful assignments that he could perform while on light duty;
- d. unlawful suspension;
- e. unlawful fabrication of disciplinary charges;
- f. unlawful interference with, and denial of, promotion opportunities;

- g. unlawful deprivation of access to Plaintiff's personnel files;
- h. unlawful failure to provide adequate medical treatment for injuries sustained at work;
- i. unlawful interference with doctors' treatment instructions;
- j. unlawful violation of Plaintiff's rights;
- k. unlawful violation of the PBA collective bargaining agreement.

220. Defendants' actions constitute violations of the common law prohibition against discharging an employee in violation of public policy, as established by the New Jersey Supreme Court in *Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.*, 84 N.J. 58 (1980).

221. As a direct and/or proximate result of the retaliation of all defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered damages and has been deprived of economic and noneconomic benefits including, but not limited to, lost wages, pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of fringe benefits, loss of promotional opportunities, and other damages.

222. The conduct of all defendants, and each of them, was knowing, willful, wanton and was designed to deprive Plaintiff of his rights as guaranteed under the law, thereby entitling Plaintiff to an award of punitive and/or exemplary damages.

223. At all relevant times, the individual defendants acted as agents of the Township of Wayne, and thus the Township of Wayne is vicariously liable for their actions and omissions.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for compensatory and punitive damages plus interest, costs, and attorneys' fees and such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

COUNT V
FALSE IMPRISONMENT/FALSE ARREST
Plaintiff v. All Defendants

224. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all previous and subsequent paragraphs of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein.

225. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, intentionally detained and/or confined Plaintiff against his will within boundaries set by the defendants.

226. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, intentionally detained and/or confined Plaintiff against his will:

- a. during periods of light duty when he was isolated and confined to a small room in police headquarters under penalty of suspension and termination;
- b. during his workers' comp medical leave when he was isolated and confined to his home under penalty of suspension and termination despite doctors' orders to the contrary;
- c. during his attendance at a medically unnecessary in-patient gambling rehabilitation facility that he was forced to attend under penalty of immediate termination, resulting in total deprivation of contact with his wife, children, parents, in-laws, friends, and colleagues.

227. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, had no legal authority, legal justification for Plaintiff's detention and/or confinement.

228. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, acted maliciously and without probable cause for Plaintiff's detention and/or confinement.

229. At all times material Plaintiff was aware of the detention and/or confinement.

230. As a direct and/or proximate result of the defendants' detention and/or confinement of Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered damages and has been deprived of economic and noneconomic benefits including, but not limited to, lost wages, pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of fringe benefits, loss of promotional opportunities, and other damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for compensatory and punitive damages plus interest, costs, and attorneys' fees and such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

COUNT VI
INTENTIONAL INFLECTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Plaintiff v. All Defendants

231. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all previous and subsequent paragraphs of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein.

232. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, were aware that Plaintiff was entitled to light duty under doctors' orders.

233. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, were aware that Plaintiff was diagnosed with, and suffering from, PTSD and emotional distress.

234. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, were aware that Plaintiff was diagnosed with PTSD and emotional distress by doctors with competent medical credentials, including a doctor acting on their own behalf.

235. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, directly contravened the doctors' orders for the treatment of physical injury, PTSD and emotional distress by wrongfully confining Plaintiff to his home and isolating Plaintiff from interaction with others.

236. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, engaged in other outrageous, intentional acts that were coldly calculated to cause emotional distress to Plaintiff including:

- a. engaging in racketeering activities that affected Plaintiff
- b. discriminating against Plaintiff;
- c. harassing Plaintiff;
- d. confining and/or detaining Plaintiff;
- e. failing to provide adequate treatment for Plaintiff's injuries sustained at work;
- f. hindering doctors' treatment of Plaintiff's disability;
- g. interfering with Plaintiff's promotional opportunities at work;
- h. fabricating disciplinary charges against plaintiff;
- i. wrongfully suspending plaintiff;
- j. violating plaintiff's rights;
- k. retaliating against Plaintiff.

237. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, knew that their actions would cause emotional distress, would exacerbate Plaintiff's condition, and would hinder and delay Plaintiff's recovery.

238. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, acted with outrageous, willful, wanton, and callous disregard for Plaintiff's well-being and his rights.

239. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, acted with willful, intentional, extreme and outrageous conduct toward Plaintiff.

240. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, knew that there was a high probability that their intentional acts would create emotional distress and they acted with deliberate and/or reckless disregard of that risk.

241. At all times material the intentional and willful actions of all defendants, and each of them, directly and/or proximately caused emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.

242. As a direct and/or proximate result of the defendants' intentional acts, Plaintiff has suffered damages and has been deprived of economic and noneconomic benefits including, but not limited to, lost wages, pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of fringe benefits, loss of promotional opportunities, and other damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for compensatory and punitive damages plus interest, costs, attorney's fees and such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

COUNT VII
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Plaintiff v. All Defendants

243. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all previous and subsequent paragraphs of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein.

244. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, had duties to refrain from:
- a. engaging in racketeering activities that affected Plaintiff
 - b. discriminating against Plaintiff;
 - c. harassing Plaintiff;
 - d. confining and/or detaining Plaintiff;
 - e. failing to provide adequate treatment for Plaintiff's injuries sustained at work;
 - f. hindering doctors' treatment of Plaintiff's disability;
 - g. interfering with Plaintiff's promotional opportunities at work;
 - h. fabricating disciplinary charges against plaintiff;

- i. wrongfully suspending plaintiff;
- j. violating plaintiff's rights;
- k. retaliating against Plaintiff.

245. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, breached their duties and were negligent in that they:

- a. engaged in racketeering activities that affected Plaintiff
- b. discriminated against Plaintiff;
- c. harassed Plaintiff;
- d. confined and/or detained Plaintiff;
- e. failed to provide medical treatment for Plaintiff's injuries sustained at work;
- f. hindered doctors' treatment of Plaintiff's disability;
- g. interfered with Plaintiff's promotional opportunities at work;
- h. fabricated disciplinary charges against plaintiff;
- i. wrongfully suspended plaintiff;
- j. violated plaintiff's rights;
- k. retaliated against Plaintiff.

246. At all times material there was an immediate and physical impact and injury caused by the defendants' negligence which created emotional damages including but not limited to physical confinement and isolation, the commission of crimes against Plaintiff, and the systematic, continuous and ongoing discrimination against Plaintiff.

247. At all times material there existed special circumstances wherein defendants were aware of doctors' orders for Plaintiff's treatment for his disabilities and their disregard of doctors' orders guaranteed the likelihood of a genuine and serious claim for emotional distress.

248. At all times material there existed special circumstances wherein defendants were Plaintiff's employers and they had duties to treat Plaintiff fairly and in accordance with the law, the Attorney General's policies, the Township of Wayne rules and regulations, and the PBA collective bargaining agreement and their disregard thereof guaranteed the likelihood of a genuine and serious claim for emotional distress.

249. As a direct and/or proximate result of the foregoing negligence, actions and omissions, Plaintiff has suffered damages and has been deprived of economic and noneconomic benefits including, but not limited to, lost wages, pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of fringe benefits, loss of promotional opportunities, and other damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for compensatory and punitive damages plus interest, costs, attorney's fees and such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

COUNT VIII
NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff v. All Defendants

250. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all previous and subsequent paragraphs of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein.

251. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, had duties to refrain from:

- a. engaging in racketeering activities that affected Plaintiff
- b. discriminating against Plaintiff;
- c. harassing Plaintiff;
- d. confining and/or detaining Plaintiff;
- e. failing to provide adequate treatment for Plaintiff's injuries sustained at work;
- f. hindering doctors' treatment of Plaintiff's disability;

- g. interfering with Plaintiff's promotional opportunities at work;
- h. fabricating disciplinary charges against plaintiff;
- i. wrongfully suspending plaintiff;
- j. violating plaintiff's rights;
- k. retaliating against Plaintiff.

252. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, breached their duties and were negligent in that they:

- a. engaged in racketeering activities that affected Plaintiff
- b. discriminated against Plaintiff;
- c. harassed Plaintiff;
- d. confined and/or detained Plaintiff;
- e. failed to provide medical treatment for Plaintiff's injuries sustained at work;
- f. hindered doctors' treatment of Plaintiff's disability;
- g. interfered with Plaintiff's promotional opportunities at work;
- h. fabricated disciplinary charges against plaintiff;
- i. wrongfully suspended plaintiff;
- j. violated plaintiff's rights;
- k. retaliated against Plaintiff.

253. At all times material all defendants had other duties that they violated in that they had duties to treat Plaintiff fairly and in accordance with the law, the Attorney General's policies, the Township of Wayne rules and regulations, and the PBA collective bargaining agreement.

254. As a direct and/or proximate result of the foregoing breaches of duties, negligence, actions and omissions, Plaintiff has suffered damages and has been deprived of

economic and noneconomic benefits including, but not limited to, lost wages, pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of fringe benefits, loss of promotional opportunities, and other damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for compensatory and punitive damages plus interest, costs, attorney's fees and such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

COUNT IX
WILLFUL MISCONDUCT BY A PUBLIC OFFICIAL
VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. § 59:3-14
Plaintiff v. All Defendants

255. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all previous and subsequent paragraphs of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein.

256. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, were public officials.

257. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, engaged in conduct that was outside the scope of their employment, constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, and/or constituted willful misconduct.

258. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, engaged in conduct that constituted the crimes of:

- a. racketeering in violation of N.J.S.A. §§ 2C:41-1 *et seq.*
- b. failing to pay or account for money or property of another upon lawful demand in violation of N.J.S.A. § 2C:20-9.
- c. false imprisonment in violation of N.J.S.A. § 2C:13-3.
- d. discrimination in violation of N.J.S.A. §§ 10:5-1 *et seq.*

259. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, engaged in actual fraud by:

- a. concocting false and fraudulent disciplinary allegations against Plaintiff in the form of over 120 violations during the course of only three duty shifts; and
- b. by falsely and fraudulently claiming that purchasing scratch off lottery tickets while on duty is a violation of department rules when there is no such thing.¹

260. At all times material all defendants, and each of them, engaged in conduct that was outside the scope of their employment, constituted actual malice and/or constituted willful misconduct by performing the following acts:

- a. falsely claiming they were on official police business while in uniform to coerce Plaintiff's doctors to release his medical records;
- b. engaging in racketeering activities that affected Plaintiff;
- c. discriminating against Plaintiff;
- d. harassing Plaintiff;
- e. confining and/or detaining Plaintiff;
- f. failing to provide adequate treatment for Plaintiff's injuries sustained at work;
- g. hindering doctors' treatment of Plaintiff's disability;
- h. interfering with Plaintiff's promotional opportunities at work;
- i. fabricating disciplinary charges against plaintiff;
- j. wrongfully suspending plaintiff;
- k. violating plaintiff's rights;
- l. retaliating against Plaintiff.

¹ Plaintiff will also prove that at all times relevant herein, 1) that Clarke worked at a gambling facility, the Meadowlands Racetrack; and 2) that Clarke and O'Sullivan engaged in gambling while on duty by participating in the office Superbowl pool; and 3) that Clarke and O'Sullivan engaged in gambling while on duty by buying lottery tickets.

261. As a direct and/or proximate result of the foregoing willful misconduct by all defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered damages and has been deprived of economic and noneconomic benefits including, but not limited to, lost wages, pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of fringe benefits, loss of promotional opportunities, and other damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for compensatory and punitive damages plus interest, costs, attorney's fees and such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

CERTIFICATION OF OTHER ACTIONS

Pursuant to R. 4:5-1, I hereby certify that the matter in controversy is not the subject of any other pending or contemplated action or arbitration proceeding. This party is not aware of any other parties who should be joined in this action at this time.


DESIGNATION OF TRIAL COUNSEL

Ralph P. Ferrara, Esq. is hereby designated as trial counsel of behalf of the Plaintiff in the within matter.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by Jury as to all issues raised herein.

FERRARA LAW GROUP, P.C.

BY: 

RALPH P. FERRARA, ESQUIRE
Attorney for Plaintiff

DATED: July 10, 2019

VERIFICATION

I, RICK VANDERCLOCK, of full age hereby certify:

I am a police officer currently employed in the Patrol Division of the Wanye Police Department. I have held this position since 2003. I have read the Complaint and I certify that the allegations contained in the Complaint are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

I certify that the foregoing statements are true. I am aware that if any statement made herein is willfully false, I am subject to punishment.


RICK VANDERCLOCK

Dated: July 9, 2019

Exhibit A

WAYNE TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT

Internal Affairs Complaint Notification

Date: January 29, 2018

To: PO Rick Vanderclock

Badge No. 224

You are hereby notified that an internal affairs complaint has been made against you. This complaint involves an allegation of

Neglect of Duty, by attending to personal business while you were assigned to a Patrol zone, which may be in violation of the Wayne Police Department Rules & Regulations, 1:4.17.

which occurred on or about January 7, 2018

You will be contacted by internal affairs when you will be needed for an interview.

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of this notice:

Signature

1-29-18

Date

Exhibit B

LAST CHANCE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE TOWNSHIP OF WAYNE AND PATROL OFFICER
RICK VANDERCLOCK

This LAST CHANCE AGREEMENT (hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement") is entered into this ____ day of June, 2018, by and between the TOWNSHIP OF WAYNE ("Employer" or "Township"), and RICK VANDERCLOCK ("Employee" or "Vanderclock"). The Township and the Employee are collectively referred to as the "Parties."

WHEREAS, the Employee is employed as a patrol officer in the Township Police Department; and

WHEREAS, the Township is prepared to file disciplinary charges seeking Employee's termination, which have been held in abeyance upon agreement of the parties by letter dated May 2, 2018; and

WHEREAS, the Township and the Employee now desire to resolve this matter amicably, without terminating the Employee's employment with the Township, by providing the Employee with a Last Chance Agreement.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Employee and the Township agree as follows:

1. The Employee hereby acknowledges that his conduct in connection with the Internal Affairs Investigation No. 18-1208

constitutes grounds for discipline, and, as such, Employee agrees to accept the penalty set forth below;

a. Employee shall plead guilty to conduct unbecoming a police officer.

b. The Employee shall serve an unpaid suspension for twenty (20) twelve (12) hour shifts, which equates to a two hundred and forty (240) hour suspension. This suspension shall be served consecutively.

c. Employee expressly waives any monetary claim or claims that he has or may have against the Township including, but not limited to, claims for back pay, benefits and/or attorneys' fees. The Chief of Police shall schedule the suspension days at his sole discretion.

d. Employee shall enroll in a gambling addiction program ("program"), successfully complete such program, comply with the program recommendations and provide written proof of successful completion of said program to the Chief of Police.

2. LAST CHANCE- The Employee further agrees that if, in the future, the Employee violates any of the provisions of this Agreement, or any statute, rule, regulation or policy of the Township, involving or demonstrating a lack of candor or engaging in any form of gambling while on duty, the appropriate penalty shall be termination of employment after a guilty plea

or a final adjudication of the disciplinary charges. Employee agrees that he shall not contest the penalty of termination and that in any resulting hearing, the issues shall be limited to whether the Employee committed the underlying offense, and that Employee shall be foreclosed from seeking any other or lesser penalty, and that the arbitrator, hearing officer and/or judge shall be foreclosed from considering any lesser penalty, other than a termination of employment.

4. CONSULTATION. Employee has had an opportunity to meet with legal counsel and/or a union representative with respect to this Agreement, and review with his legal counsel and/or union representative all the terms and conditions of this Agreement. Furthermore, Employee represents and warrants that he has been represented fully, fairly and without bias in connection with this matter.

5. WAIVER. Vanderclock hereby waives any and all claims, grievances, demands for arbitration and any other appeal in any form, administrative or judicial, with respect to this disciplinary action, including, but not limited to, a departmental hearing, back pay, benefits, attorneys' fees and/or costs;

6. MODIFICATION. No modification or amendment of this Agreement will be enforceable unless it is in writing and signed by all the Parties;

7. **SEVERABILITY.** Should any provision of this Agreement be declared or determined by any court of competent jurisdiction to be illegal, invalid or unenforceable, the legality, validity and enforceability of the remaining parts, terms, or provisions shall not be affected thereby and said illegal, unenforceable or invalid part, term or provisions shall be deemed not to be a part of this Agreement;

8. **REPRESENTATION.** Vanderclock represents and warrants that he has carefully read each and every provision of this Agreement, and that he fully understands all of the terms and conditions contained in each provision of this Agreement. Vanderclock represents and warrants that he enters into this Agreement voluntarily, on his own free will, without any pressure or coercion from the Township, the Union or any person or entity. Vanderclock understands that by signing this Agreement, he is giving up his right to have a hearing on this matter in which he could be found not guilty of the charges against him;


9. **NON-PRECEDENTIAL.** This Agreement is entered into with the understanding that it is without precedent does not establish any past practice and shall not be referred to in any other case or matter between the Township and/or any employee of the Township, except that this Agreement can be used to

establish that Vanderclock was given a last chance to comply with Township rules, regulations, policies, directives and law;

10. COMPLETE AGREEMENT. This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the Township and Vanderclock with respect to the subject matter and supersedes all prior agreements, understandings and/or dealings whether written or otherwise with respect to the same subject matter. There is no agreement on part of the Township to do anything other than what is expressly stated in this Agreement. This Agreement shall in all respects be interpreted, enforced and governed by the laws of the State of New Jersey.


BY SIGNING BELOW, THE PARTIES REPRESENT AND WARRANT THAT THEY HAVE THE CAPACITY TO SIGN THIS AGREEMENT ARE LEGALLY AUTHORIZED TO DO WITH THE INTENT TO BE BOUND BY THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT. THE PARTIES FURTHER REPRESENT AND WARRANT THAT THEY SIGN THIS AGREEMENT WILLFULLY AND VOLUNTARILY AND WITHOUT COERCION OR UNDUE INFLUENCE OF ANY KIND. BY SIGNING BELOW, THE PARTIES REPRESENT AND WARRANT THAT THEY HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND ALL OF THIS TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT AND INTEND THAT THIS BE A LEGALLY BINDING DOCUMENT.

TOWNSHIP OF WAYNE

By: 

NEAL BELLET
Borough Administrator

Dated:


RICK VANDERCLOCK

Dated:

6-22-18

Exhibit C

TO: NEAL BELLET
FROM: P.O. Rick Vanderlock #224
DATE: JUNE 29, 2018
RE: RESCIND LAST CHANCE AGREEMENT

This is to inform you that I am Rescinding my agreement with the "Last Chance" document that I signed on June 22, 2018. When I signed the document, I was pressured and did not fully understand the terms. I was under stress at the signing and although I read the document, I feel that I did not fully understand the implications. I believe that I was misguided by my attorney about the guarantees related to that document. I was pressured by several people. Beyond that I am not guilty. I do not have and did not have a need for enrollment in a gambling addiction program. I have been a police officer for over 20 years and have never been suspended for even one day. Furthermore, As of this date I have not received copies of the fully executed document.

Respectfully submitted,
P.O. Rick Vanderlock #224




Exhibit D

June 21, 2018



Jeffery Ziegelhelm, Esquire
Alterman & Associates LLC
8 S Maple Ave,
Marlton, NJ 08053
Phone: (856) 334-5737
Cell: (201) 800-3411
jz@alterman-law.com

RE: Rick Vanderclock

DOB: 04/28/1975

To Whom It May Concern,

I am writing this letter on behalf of Rick Vanderclock. Mr. Vanderclock began treatment on 06/01/2018 and was discharged from The Florida House Experience – First Responders Program on 06/11/2018 after completing his course of treatment with our facility. Mr. Vanderclock can return to work with no restrictions and is medically cleared to perform his duties.

If I can be of any further assistance, please feel free to contact me directly at 954-422-1344.

Sincerely,

Heather Brathwaite A.N.R.P., PhD

Heather Brathwaite A.N.R.P., PhD
Psychiatric Services
The Florida House Experience
(954) 421-6242 / (866) 421-6242

Civil Case Information Statement

Case Details: PASSAIC | Civil Part Docket# L-002155-19

Case Caption: VANDERCLOCK RICK VS THE TOWNSHIP
OF WAYN E

Case Initiation Date: 07/10/2019

Attorney Name: RALPH PETER FERRARA

Firm Name: FERRARA LAW GROUP, PC

Address: 50 W STATE ST STE 1100
TRENTON NJ 08608

Phone:

Name of Party: PLAINTIFF : Vanderclock, Rick

Name of Defendant's Primary Insurance Company
(if known): Unknown

Case Type: EMPLOYMENT (OTHER THAN CEPA OR LAD)

Document Type: Complaint with Jury Demand

Jury Demand: YES - 6 JURORS

Hurricane Sandy related? «sandyRelated»

Is this a professional malpractice case? NO

Related cases pending: NO

If yes, list docket numbers:

**Do you anticipate adding any parties (arising out of same
transaction or occurrence)?** YES

THE INFORMATION PROVIDED ON THIS FORM CANNOT BE INTRODUCED INTO EVIDENCE
CASE CHARACTERISTICS FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING IF CASE IS APPROPRIATE FOR MEDIATION

Do parties have a current, past, or recurrent relationship? YES

If yes, Is that relationship: Employer/Employee

Does the statute governing this case provide for payment of fees by the losing party? NO

**Use this space to alert the court to any special case characteristics that may warrant individual
management or accelerated disposition:**

Do you or your client need any disability accommodations? NO
If yes, please identify the requested accommodation:

Will an Interpreter be needed? NO
If yes, for what language:

Please check off each applicable category: Putative Class Action? NO Title 59? NO

I certify that confidential personal identifiers have been redacted from documents now submitted to the court, and will be redacted from all documents submitted in the future in accordance with Rule 1:38-7(b)

07/10/2019
Dated

/s/ RALPH PETER FERRARA
Signed

NJ SUPERIOR COURT LAWYER REFERRAL AND LEGAL SERVICE LIST

ATLANTIC COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court
Civil Division, Direct Filing
1201 Bacharach Blvd., 1st Fl.
Atlantic City, NJ 08401
LAWYER REFERRAL
(609) 345-3444
LEGAL SERVICES
(609) 348-4200

ESSEX COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court
Civil Customer Service
Hall of Records, Room 201
465 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
Blvd.
Newark, NJ 07102
LAWYER REFERRAL
(973) 622-6204
LEGAL SERVICES
(973) 624-4500

MONMOUTH COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court
Court House
P. O. Box 1269
Freehold, NJ 07728-1269
LAWYER REFERRAL
(732) 431-5544
LEGAL SERVICES
(732) 866-0020

SUSSEX COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior
Court
Sussex County Judicial
Center
43-47 High Street
Newton, NJ 07860
LAWYER REFERRAL
(973) 267-5882
LEGAL SERVICES
(973) 383-7400

BERGEN COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court
Civil Division, Room 115
Justice Center, 10 Main St.
Hackensack, NJ 07601
LAWYER REFERRAL
(201) 488-0044
LEGAL SERVICES
(201) 487-2166

GLOUCESTER COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court
Civil Case Management Office,
Attn: Intake, First Fl., Court
House
1 North Broad Street
Woodbury, NJ 08096
LAWYER REFERRAL
(856) 848-4589
LEGAL SERVICES
(856) 848-5360

MORRIS COUNTY:

Morris County Courthouse
Civil Division
Washington & Court Streets
P. O. Box 910
Morristown, NJ 07963-0910
LAWYER REFERRAL
(973) 267-5882
LEGAL SERVICES
(973) 285-6911

UNION COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior
Court
1st Floor, Court House
2 Broad Street
Elizabeth, NJ 07207-
6073
LAWYER REFERRAL
(908) 353-4715
LEGAL SERVICES
(908) 354-4340

BURLINGTON COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court
Central Processing Office
Attn: Judicial Intake
First Fl., Courts Facility
49 Rancocas Road
Mt. Holly, NJ 08060
LAWYER REFERRAL
(609) 261-4862
LEGAL SERVICES
(609) 261-1088

HUDSON COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court
Civil Records Dept.
Brennan Court House, 1st Floor
583 Newark Avenue
Jersey City, NJ 07306
LAWYER REFERRAL
(201) 798-2727
LEGAL SERVICES
(201) 792-6363

OCEAN COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court
Court House, Room 121
118 Washington Street
P.O. Box 2191
Toms River, NJ 08754-2191
LAWYER REFERRAL
(732) 240-3666
LEGAL SERVICES
(732) 341-2727

WARREN COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior
Court
Civil Division, Court
House
413 Second Street
Belvidere, NJ 07823-
1500
LAWYER REFERRAL
(908) 859-4300
LEGAL SERVICES
(908) 475-2010

CAMDEN COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court
Civil Processing Office
Hall of Justice
1st Fl, Suite 150
101 South 5th Street
Camden, NJ 08103
LAWYER REFERRAL
(856) 482-0618
LEGAL SERVICES
(856) 964-2010

HUNTERDON COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court,
Civil Division
65 Park Avenue
Flemington, NJ 08822
LAWYER REFERRAL
(908) 236-6109
LEGAL SERVICES
(908) 782-7979

PASSAIC COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court
Civil Division - Court House
77 Hamilton Street
Paterson, NJ 07505
LAWYER REFERRAL
(973) 278-9223
LEGAL SERVICES
(973) 523-2900

CAPE MAY COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court
9 N. Main Street
Cape May Court House, NJ
08210
LAWYER REFERRAL
(609) 463-0313
LEGAL SERVICES
(609) 465-3001

MERCER COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court
Local Filing Office, Courthouse
175 S. Broad Street
P. O. Box 8068
Trenton, NJ 08650
LAWYER REFERRAL
(609) 585-6200
LEGAL SERVICES
(609) 695-6249

SALEM COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court
Attn: Civil Case Management
Office
92 Market Street
Salem, NJ 08079
LAWYER REFERRAL
(856) 935-5629
LEGAL SERVICES
(856) 691-0494

CUMBERLAND COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court
Civil Case Management Office
60 West Broad Street
P. O. Box 10
Bridgeton, NJ 08302
LAWYER REFERRAL
(856) 696-5550
LEGAL SERVICES
(856) 691-0494

MIDDLESEX COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court
Middlesex Vicinage
Second Floor, Tower
56 Paterson Street
P. O. Box 2633
New Brunswick, NJ 08903-2633
LAWYER REFERRAL
(732) 828-0053
LEGAL SERVICES
(732) 249-7600

SOMERSET COUNTY:

Deputy Clerk, Superior Court
Civil Division Office
40 North Bridge Street
P. O. Box 3000
Somerville, NJ 08876
LAWYER REFERRAL
(908) 685-2323
LEGAL SERVICES
(908) 231-0840